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and Emerson: The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992

adequately account for the complexity
of our contemporary moral lives rests
on epistemological presuppositions
that take the moral speech acts of the
present as an epistemic starting point
rather than as resulting from historical contingency. Finally, Fisher leaves
questions about the adequacy of the just
war tradition in accounting for contemporary warfare largely unexamined.
JOSEPH M. HATFIELD

Emerson, Stephen A. The Battle for Mozambique:
The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992. Solihull, U.K.: Helion, 2014. 288pp. $35

Stephen Emerson has written the definitive work on the war in Mozambique between Frelimo (Front for the Liberation
of Mozambique) and Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance) that began in
1977 and ended with the signing of the
General Peace Agreement in October of
1992. It would be an impressive effort to
capture just the fight between these factions vying for control of Mozambique,
then newly independent after 450 years
as a Portuguese colony: Emerson goes
much further. He describes the complex
environment in which this struggle takes
place—overshadowed by a larger Cold
War and bordering countries like South
Africa with its own fight over apartheid, as well as the war against white
minority rule next door in Rhodesia.
Emerson traces the beginnings of
Frelimo and its armed struggle against
Portugal. Despite its success in gaining
independence from Portugal in 1975
after over a decade of war, Frelimo
struggled with postindependence nation building. Formed by opponents of
the Marxist-aligned Frelimo, Renamo
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initially achieved operational effectiveness by obtaining arms, logistics, training, intelligence, and planning support
from a Rhodesia seeking to counter
Frelimo’s support of Robert Mugabe and
the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) forces. Mugabe’s eventual
success in establishing an internationally recognized Zimbabwean state cost
Renamo its major benefactor. In the
1980s, however, Renamo gained a new
partner in its fight against Frelimo from
the South African government of P. W.
Botha looking to create instability in its
“frontline states” as a way to stave off
support for the African National Congress. This patronage allowed Renamo
to continue its fight against Frelimo—
now the ruling party of an independent
Mozambique—for another thirteen
years.
The conflict’s ebbs and flows affected every part of the country and
its inhabitants. Between 800,000 and 1
million Mozambicans were killed in the
fighting, and more than 2 million were
displaced. The war’s effects included
a plundering of natural resources and
environmental disasters made worse
by drought. An end to the Cold War
and South Africa’s apartheid regime—
coupled with leadership changes in
Frelimo itself and all-around war
exhaustion—eventually enabled peace
talks and a successful settlement.
The Battle for Mozambique benefits
from Emerson’s decade of research. It
reflects his access to formerly classified
Rhodesian military documents coupled
with the firsthand accounts gleaned
from hundreds of hours of interviews
with both former Frelimo and former
Renamo fighters as well as Rhodesian
and South African military and civilian personnel. The descriptions of
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operations and battles are graphic and
bring a reality not seen very often.
A longtime resident of southern Africa,
Emerson is a renowned scholar of
African affairs, having served as Chair
of Security Studies at the U.S. National
Defense University’s Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, and as head of the
Africa regional studies program at the
U.S. Naval War College. His knowledge
and experience make The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle,
1977–1992 a must-read for anyone
seeking to understand the history and
challenges of the African continent.
ROGER H. DUCEY

Epstein, Katherine. Torpedo: Inventing the
Military-Industrial Complex in the United States
and Great Britain. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 2014. 328pp. $45

Kate Epstein’s book about the relationships between the torpedo and the
creation of the military-industrial
complex builds on her earlier work
about naval tactics, in particular her essay in the April 2013 Journal of Military
History about “torpedoes and U.S. Navy
battle tactics” before World War I. (See
Katherine C. Epstein, “No One Can
Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’:
Battle Tactics and U.S. Naval History
before World War I,” Journal of Military History 7, no. 2 [April 2013], pp.
491–520.) Here she goes after much
bigger “fish”—excuse the pun. Epstein
wastes no time in getting to her primary
thesis in this fascinating monograph
about the development of the torpedo
as a weapon system in the United States
and Great Britain. She begins boldly:
“Thus, in addition to the part they
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played in the origins of the militaryindustrial complex, torpedoes were at
the nexus of the international arms race,
globalization, and industrialization after
World War I.” Epstein takes the reader
on a journey back in time to relate a
story little told and even less known.
The modern self-propelled torpedo,
invented and improved in the last half of
the nineteenth century by the Englishman Robert Whitehead, was naval
warfare’s first “fire and forget” weapon.
Like breech-loading rifles and artillery,
also products of the nineteenth century,
it changed the landscape of war in its
environment—the maritime domain.
Just as breech-loading rifles increased
the lethality and scope of land warfare,
so too did the torpedo, but on unimaginable scales in a very short time
period. As Epstein notes in her introduction, “Over a fifty-year period the speed
of torpedoes had increased by roughly
800 percent, and their range by 5,000
percent. They were the cutting edge of
technology.” When combined with other
so-called disruptive technologies, like
the airplane and the submarine—that is,
technologies so unique that they break
sociopolitical, commercial, and military
paradigms—they had the potential to
and, in fact, did throw existing notions
of sea power, naval tactics, and even
maritime strategy into question. It was
no accident that the great maritime
strategists—A. T. Mahan and Sir Julian
Corbett—emerged during the period
of the torpedo’s rise to prominence
as sailors recast their thinking about
naval tactics in the modern age in part
because of cutting-edge technology.
Epstein builds on the work of historian
William McNeill and his arguments
about the emergence of “command
technology” in the nineteenth century,
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